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The Link between International 
Supervision and Banking Crises 
 
Summary: Theoretical and empirical contributions of some economists have
shown that a financial liberalisation policy implemented in a less developed
institutional environment enhances the proliferation of banking crises. This
leads to the conclusion that failure at the level of banking governance plays a
significant role in the emergence of crises. By using multivariate logit, our em-
pirical study samples of 12 emerging countries to study the relationship be-
tween banking supervision and banking crises during the period 1980-2003. 
Our results show a negative and insignificant association between banking 
regulation and the probability of occurrence of banking crises. We find the
likelihood of banking crises is greater in countries with poor banking supervi-
sion. In short, the condition required for a sound banking system is to reinforce
banking supervision during financial liberalisation phases.
Key words: Financial liberalisation, Banking crises, Prudential supervision and 
multivariate logit. 
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In order to reinforce its beneficial role to the economy, the banking system is granted 
permission to proceed with financial liberalisation processes. Allowing the develop-
ment of the real sphere through an optimal capital allowance within a freely emerg-
ing financial context, financial liberalisation aims at improving the degree of effi-
ciency and profitability of the banking system. Nevertheless, a financial liberalisation 
initiative, doubtlessly one of the attractive facets of the world economy, strongly con-
tributed to very significant banking malfunctions (Juncal Cuñado, Javier Gómez Bis-
carri, and Fernando Pérez de Gracia 2006; Romain Ranciere, Aaron Tornell, and 
Frank Westermann 2006; Betty Daniel and John Bailey Jones 2007; Mariassunta 
Giannetti 2007). The banking crises stream stipulates that financial liberalisation in-
creasingly exposed banks to risks and changed the structures closely supervised by 
the government. Thus, the banking system has become the weakest link in the chain 
of financial systems. In order to solve banking crisis problems, prudential regulation 
mechanisms have been set up. This prudential regulation perspective is the subject of 
much research. Carolyn Currie (2006), Lukas Menkhoff and Chodechai Suwanaporn 
(2007), Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt, Enrica Detragiache, and Thierry Tressel (2008) show a 
financial liberalisation initiative implemented in an underdeveloped institutional en-
vironment reinforces the proliferation of banking crises. Failure at the level of bank-
ing supervision may be a source of aggravation in banking crises. Following this line, 
Hamid Mehram (2004) shows that adequate banking governance incites healthy and 
sustainable economic development. Likewise, Gerard Caprio, Luc Laeven, and Ross 
Levine (2007) conclude good governance guarantees efficient allocation of savings. 322  Houssem Rachdi 
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For Marco Arnone, Salim Darbar, and Alessandro Gambini (2007), prudential bank-
ing regulation is positively linked to performance and stability.  
However, other researchers conclude prudential regulation does not contribute 
to avoiding yet eliminating banking crises. In fact, André Icard (2002) and Andre 
Cartapanis (2003) show banking governance does not allow improvement of finan-
cial system security. Cartapanis (2003) observes banking governance cannot contain 
systemic risk, the ultimate risk for banks. These authors explain that crises spread 
with spectacular speed from one economy to another through the financial and busi-
ness exchanges between countries. Finally, it is very useful to highlight the results of 
the different studies about the impact of prudential regulation on banking system se-
curity are most often mitigated. The result would be an absence of consensus. The 
first section of this article examines the theoretical considerations of financial libera-
lisation, prudential regulation, and banking crises. The second section exposes the 
econometric methodology chosen. Our conclusions are presented in the third section.  
 
1. Financial Liberalisation, Crises, and International Supervision  
 
A review of financial literature about bank crises shows two research paradigms at-
tempted to determine the main reasons for these crises. The first paradigm claims 
bank crises rest on macroeconomic foundations and those conditions inappropriate to 
a financial liberalisation process constitute the principal reason behind bank crises. 
Alternatively, the second paradigm supports the idea that bank crises rest on micro-
economic foundations. This latter stream supposes transformation of the banking 
environment in this new globalization era constitutes the second cause of bank crises. 
Hence, the necessity to improve the institutional environment - in order to guarantee 
bank solvency - constitutes an inevitable task to perform. This improvement may 
manifest itself in installing an effective banking governance system. The end of the 
last century was marked by the development of a vast theoretical and empirical lite-
rature treating the causality binding financial liberalisation and economic develop-
ment. Reading this literature points to the conclusion that financial liberalisation is 
the way to improve developing countries’ economic efficiency. This finding is ex-
plained by the fact that these countries suffer from the absence of banking intermedi-
ation, essentially linked to setting interest rates and rethinking the role of the gov-
ernment. Patrick Honothan (1997) affirms that public authorities’ intervention, at the 
level of the banking system, is a financial distress signal for banks characterized by 
the deterioration of their assets. In addition, state intervention is an indicator of fra-
gility if the banking sector is open and submitted to foreign competition.  
In light of this observation, Geert Bekaert, Campbell Harvey, and Christian 
Lundblad (2005), Bonghoon Kim and Lawrence Kenny (2007), Laura Alfaro and 
Eliza Hammel (2007), among others, suggest developing countries must liberalize 
the banking system to ensure its proper functioning and to reinforce economic devel-
opment. According to these authors, financial liberalisation defends the idea accord-
ing to which a freely emerging financial sphere allows development of the real 
sphere through an optimal savings allocation and generates rapid economic develop-
ment for developing countries. In the same vein, Saumitra Bhaduri (2005), based on 
a study conducted in India, concludes financial liberalisation, reducing the role of the 323  The Link between International Supervision and Banking Crises 
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state in the economy, disrupts investments schemes. If the market ensures the deter-
mination of interest rates, financial liberalisation reduces market imperfections and 
improves allocation of resources. Also, according to Essahbi Essaadi, Jamel Jouini, 
and Wajih Khallouli (2009), financial liberalisation facilitates economic integration 
markets and interdependence between economies. 
In order to acheive increased financial development and growth, financial libe-
ralisation has been implemented. Nevertheless, the expected result was ellusive. Fi-
nancial liberalisation led to serious bank crises. Indeed, financial liberalisation is an 
internal and external factor increasing economies’ fragility. The contribution of fi-
nancial liberalisation in terms of financial development and economic growth is 
strongly questioned. This thesis is corroborated elsewhere by Daniel and Jones 
(2007), concluding financial liberalisation initiatives preceded the majority of bank-
ing crises affecting emerging economies. In this context, Ranciere, Tornell, and Wes-
termann (2006) show the process of financial liberalisation may increase, at a high 
level of risk, the volatility of macroeconomic indicators and may raise the probability 
of starting banking crises. Other studies; particularly those conducted by Ray Barrell, 
Philip Davis, and Olga Pomerantz (2006) and Rangan Gupta and Andreas Karapata-
kis (2008) validate this conclusion. 
The existence of a relationship between banking crises and policies of finan-
cial liberalisation, often radical in nature, has been validated as well by several re-
searcher economists. Graciela Kaminsky and Carmen Reinhart (1999) conducted a 
study of a panel of 20 countries in Latin America, Europe, and Asia over the period 
1970-1995. They conclude the number of banking crises strongly increased and poli-
cies of financial liberalisation precede these crises. Always within the frame of anal-
ysis of financial liberalisation and banking crises sensitivity, James Barth, Gerard 
Caprio, and Ross Levine (1999) examine the link between financial regulation, fi-
nancial fragility, and economic performance. They affirm that countries with the 
most regulatory and restrictive systems are likely to eradicate banking crises. How-
ever, Klaus Fisher, Jean-Pierre Gueyie, and Edgar Ortiz (1997), on the basis of a 
study conducted on individual data collected on Malaysia, Thailand, and Taiwan, 
conclude banks are exposed to high risks during the process of financial liberalisa-
tion. Consequent liberalisation increases emerging economies’ exposure to external 
disturbances, making local banks fragile. Aslı Demirgüç-Kunt and Enrica Detra-
giache (1998, 1999) and Ilan Noy (2004) affirm that liberalisation of the local finan-
cial sector raises the probability of the banking system becoming increasingly fragile 
due to a suppression of profitability, control of credits’ interest rates, and barriers 
reduction for foreign banks. However, liberalisation of the domestic financial sector 
coupled with liberalisation of the financial market and the capital account constitute 
strong signals for the birth of a banking crisis in emerging countries. 
Prudential regulation is the subject of several studies. Menkhoff and Suwana-
porn (2007) state a financial liberalisation initiative undertaken in a less developed 
institutional environment increases the proliferation of banking crises, leading us to 
think the inefficiency of banking governance mechanisms may be a source aggravat-
ing banking crises. Hyman Minsky (1996) shows a weak institutional environment is 
at the centre of the dynamic of a crisis. In other words, the absence of banking go-324  Houssem Rachdi 
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vernance fuels banking fragility (Shams Pathan, Michael Skully, and J. Wickrama-
nayake 2008) under the effect of financial liberalisation, amplifying the euphoria of 
risk triggering. According to Apanard Angkinand’s (2009), adequate banking super-
vision smoothes banking crises. Akiyoshi Horiuchi (2000) affirms that banking go-
vernance malfunction is at the origin of deep crises striking Asian countries. Mehram 
(2004) shows adequate banking governance incites healthy and sustainable economic 
growth. Likewise, Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2007) conclude good governance 
guarantees an efficient savings allocation. Within these studies’ framework, in order 
to show the important role banking governance can play in the attenuating banking 
crises, other studies question the efficiency of banking governance. They conclude 
prudential regulation does not contribute to reducing and avoiding banking crises. 
Icard (2002) and Cartapanis (2003) show prudential regulation does not allow im-
provement of financial system security. They note banking governance contains a 
systemic risk, the most serious that can strike banking. These authors explain crises 
propagate with spectacular speed from one economy to another via financial and 
business exchanges between countries. Finally, consensus is absent considering 
banking governance’s impact on banking structure safety. Thus, the literature is high-
ly ambiguous as to the efficacy of banking governance to prevent the problem of 
banking crises. 
 
2. The Link between International Supervision and Banking  
Crises: A Panel Data Approach  
 
Our research objective consists of testing the effectiveness of prudential regulation to 
attenuate banking crises. To do so, we proceed through three stages. First we present 
the model to test. Then we identify and measure our variables. Finally we discuss and 
interpret the results. 
 
2.1 Presentation of the Model  
 
Our objective is to validate some panel of emerging countries by testing the relation-
ship between financial liberalisation, banking supervision, and crises. The selected 
sample is a panel of the following countries: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Chili, Co-
lumbia, Peru, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Tunisia, Morocco, and South Africa. 
Our study covers the period from 1980 to 2003. We use a general logit model to es-
timate the probability of banking crises, an approach used widely in studies on bank-
ing crises. The principal authors employing this technique are Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998, 1999). Our model is:  
 
it it it ε X β y + ′ =  
 
Our dependent variable  it y  is the crisis dummy, taking a value of one when a 
country experiences a banking crisis and zero otherwise. X is the vector of explanato-
ry variables including the constant term and β is the vector of unknown coefficients. 
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2.2 Variable Definition and Measurement11  
 
According to Kaminsky and Sergio Schmukler (2008), the variable financial liberali-
sation comprises three dimensions: Real Domestic Liberalisation, Financial Markets 
Liberalisation, and Capital Account Liberalisation. Within our study’s framework, 
we retain three dimensions only: domestic financial sector liberalisation, financial 
markets liberalisation and capital account liberalisation. For each dimension, three 
regimes are identified: completely liberalized
2, partially liberalized
3, and repressed. 
The degree of financial liberalisation is measured by the index composed of the do-
mestic financial sector, the financial markets, and the capital account and varies be-
tween zero and two: for each component, a value of zero indicates no liberalisation, 
one indicates partial liberalisation, and two indicates full liberalisation.  
For the variable banking crisis, we retain the definition of Caprio and Daniela 
Klingebiel (2003) where a banking crisis corresponds to a situation where the aggre-
gate value of banking system liabilities exceeds the value of its assets. Crisis takes 
the value of one if the country is going through a systemic crisis and zero otherwise. 
The variable prudential regulation takes the values of zero in a period of financial 
repression, the unit in period of financial liberalisation, and two if an effort to rein-
force prudential supervision follows financial liberalisation. 
Recalling the empirical literature of banking crises, especially Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache (1998, 1999), Barry Eichengreen and Andrew Rose (1998), Ka-
minsky and Reinhart (1999), Ranciere, Tornell, and Westermann (2006), Jurgen von 
Hagen and Tai-Kuang Ho (2007), we retain seven control variables (Early Warning 
Indicators): economic growth, interest rate, inflation rate, M2 over reserves, current 
account, banking credit growth, and short-term national debt over external debt.  
 
2.3 Estimation and Interpretation of Results 
 
Table 1   Financial Liberalisation, Banking Crises, and Prudential Supervision:  
Logit (Random Effects) 
 
Variables  Model 1  Model 2 
BANKING CRISIS  Coefficient  St. Error  Coefficient  St. Error 
Real interest rate  0,029 
** 0,015 0,029 
** 0,015 
Economic growth  -0,380
*** 0,086 -0,410
*** 0,092 
Inflation -0,019
*** 0,043 -0,210
*** 0,046 
Current account  0,082 
** 0,039 0,084 
** 0,041 
M2 over reserves  0,210 
* 0,126  0,192 0,130 
Credit Gap  0,102  0,068  0,131
* 0,074 
Short-term over external debt  -0,086  0,052  -0,074  0,052 
                                                        
1 The Appendix lists all variables. 
2 A regime qualifies as completely liberalized if the three sectors are liberalized perfectly. 
3 A regime qualifies partially liberalized if at least one of the three sectors is partially liberalized. 326  Houssem Rachdi 
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Financial liberalisation 
Financial Liberalisation combined 
with an effort of a reinforcement of 
banking governance 
+1,113
***
- 
0,345 
- 
- 
-0,146 
- 
0,140 
Number of countries  12    12   
Log Likelihood  -139,71    -124,58   
Wald chi 2   39,46    38,38   
Prob > chi (2)  0,000    0,000   
P value of Hausman test  0,432    0,677   
 
Note: ***, **, and * denote the significance level of 1%; 5%; and 10%, respectively 
 
Source: Author’s estimation. 
 
Econometrically, we notice all these models are globally and statistically sig-
nificant because the probabilities of Wald's test are largely less than 5%. Likewise, 
Hausman's test allows us to conclude the type of estimation we chose - estimation of 
random-based effects - is the most effective and efficient.    
The probability of banking crises is statistically significant at the level of 1% 
and positively dependent on the dummy variable of financial liberalisation (+1,113) 
(Model 1). This result corroborates Kaminsky and Schmukler (2008) on a panel of 
industrialized countries and development countries in the process of development. In 
fact, this result confirms financial liberalisation has a negative short term effect. Ka-
minsky and Schmukler (2008) affirm, “The crises of the 1990s in Asia, Europe, and 
Latin America have re-ignited the debate on the effects of financial liberalisation. 
Many argue that the deregulation of financial markets was the main trigger of many 
of the crises observed since the 1970s”. This effect disappears in the long term, once 
financial reforms familiarize themselves with new globalized finance. Thus, the 
country in question realizes a durable growth and its financial system stabilizes. 
Other empirical studies - such as those of Eichengreen and Rose (2000), Ranciere, 
Tornell, and Westermann (2006) and Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Enrica Detragiache, and 
Raghuram Rajan (2008) - show financial liberalisation is the common cause of the 
banking crises observed these last two decades. This thesis is corroborated elsewhere 
by Daniel and Jones (2007), concluding financial liberalization precedes the majority 
of banking crises affecting emerging economies. 
The results (Model 2) show the regression of the dummy variable of financial 
liberalisation combined with a reinforcement of prudential regulation on banking 
crises probability returns a negative and not statistically significant coefficient (-
0,146). This implies adequate prudential supervision tends to lower banking crisis 
probability. This result corroborates Currie (2006) and Angkinand (2009), showing 
adequate banking supervision smoothes banking crises. Indeed, a reliable internal 
and external control is an essential condition to circumvent the excessive catch of 
risk by bankers. Our result corroborates the robust arguments of Michael Alexeev 
and Sunghwan Kim (2008), affirming, “The weakness of corporate governance has 
been cited as both a cause of the Asian crisis and a crucial factor in its severity”. The 327  The Link between International Supervision and Banking Crises 
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obtained result clearly shows good banking supervision reduces banking crisis prob-
ability. 
In addition, the results emphasise that the variable economic growth is nega-
tively dependent on the probability of occurrence of one banking crisis (-0,038 and -
0,410). Our results corroborate those of Kim and Kenny (2007), who note a high 
growth rate is a good sign for the economy at large. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1998) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) show banking crises tend to occur in 
times of weak or negative real growth. However, Claudio Borio and Philip Lowe 
(2002) object, showing economic growth could be an origin of banking crisis. Con-
firming theoretical predictions, the results show the ratio M2 over reserves is posi-
tively dependent on probability of one banking crisis (+ 0,210). In other words, the 
higher this ratio, the more the country is vulnerable to shareholders’ confidence cri-
ses if the banks’ exchange reserves fall (Cartapanis 2002). M2 over reserves forms a 
reliable indicator, also allowing measurement of central bank capacity to confront a 
fall in currencies reserves following a banking crisis. The ratio of short-term national 
debt to external debt is negatively dependent on banking crises probability (-0,086 
and -0,074). This negative relationship is reasonable considering banks illustrate the 
capacity of a country to honour its financial engagements on the international capital 
market. Inflation is negatively dependent on the probability of a banking crisis   
(-0,019 and -0,210). This result corroborates the result of Caprio and Klingebiel 
(1996), arguing crises are likelier in countries with higher inflation. Also, like De-
mirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), we find high real interest rates raise the like-
lihood of banking crises. These results suggest poor domestic micro and macroeco-
nomic policies are the main early warning indicators of banking crises 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
This article aims to apprehend the role the institutional environment can play; more 
precisely, the impact of prudential regulation on the possibility of banking crises. 
Since the Basel Committee’s work on prudential supervision, prudential regulation as 
an instrument of fighting against banking structures crises has been the subject of 
much research. The results are generally mitigated and sometimes even contradic-
tory. Many studies show prudential regulation contributes to reducing the risk of 
banking crises and consequently to improve the performance and the profitability of 
banks. Mehram (2004) shows good prudential regulation ensures a healthy and dura-
ble economic growth. Along the same line, Noy (2004) and Menkhoff and Suwan-
aporn (2007) note a process of financial liberalisation concomitantly followed by a 
reinforcement of prudential regulation makes it possible to reduce banking crises 
probability. However, an examination of the literature also reveals prudential regula-
tion cannot play a role in banking crises. Indeed, many studies note prudential regu-
lation does not contribute to reducing and avoiding banking crises. These studies 
question the utility of the Basel Committee’s work on prudential supervision. Within 
this analytical framework, Icard (2002) and Cartapanis (2003) show banking govern-
ance, seen from prudential regulation, does not allow for improving financial system 
safety in its macroeconomic form. Accordingly, banking governance cannot contain 
systemic risk, the most serious risk for banks given it propagates from one bank to 328  Houssem Rachdi 
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another. Our empirical study of ten emerging countries during the period of 1980 
through 2003 confirms reinforcement of banking governance during the process of 
financial liberalisation constitutes a condition necessary and useful to an efficient 
banking system. Indeed, the results show banking governance is negatively corre-
lated with the probability of occurrence of banking crises. Thus, a well controlled 
financial liberalisation process adopted in a favourable environment coupled with 
good banking governance ensures stability of emerging countries’ banking systems. 
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Appendix 
 
Definitions and Data Sources of All Variables  
 
Variables  Definition Source
Banking crises 
index 
Dummy variable: 1 if there is a crisis and 0 if not Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2003)
Financial  
Liberalisation 
To refer to Rebecca M. Neumann, Ron Penl, 
and Altin Tanku (2008), financial liberalisation 
takes: a value of 1 indicates no liberalisation, 2 
indicates partial liberalisation, and 3 indicates full 
liberalisation 
Kaminsky and  
Schmukler (2008) 
Economic Growth  GDP growth  WDI 
Inflation Consumer  price  index  WDI 
Real interest rate  Nominal interest - Inflation  IFS: line 60b and line 64 
Current Account  Current account divided by GDP  WDI 
M2/international  
reserves 
M2 over international reserves  WDI 
Credit gap  Credit to private sector divided by GDP  WDI 
Short-term debt  Short-term debt over external debt  WDI 
Prudential  
Regulation 
 
 
 
This index takes zero in a period of financial 
repression, the unit in period of financial liberali-
sation and two if financial liberalisation was fol-
lowed by an effort of reinforcement of prudential 
supervision. 
Laeven (2003) and 
Kaminsky and  
Schmukler (2008)  
 
 
 
 